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THAILAND: TOWARD A DEVELOPED, 
RICE-EXPORTING COUNTRY 
SHINICHI SHIGETOMI 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The sharp rise of the international rice price in the first half of 2008 instantly affected the 
domestic rice market of Thailand, causing the consumer price to double in just six months 
from December 2007 to May 2008. However, there was no hoarding reported among 
consumers and traders, much less demonstrations or riots in cities. Although the government 
released some of its rice stock through its own retailing routes at a cheaper price, its basic 
stance was to leave the market mechanism to work by itself. Rather, collective actions 
occurred in the countryside, not in cities. When the trend of farm-gate paddy price turned 
downward from the peak of 13,259 baht per metric ton in April, 2008,1 farmers started to 
demonstrate collectively their dissatisfaction with the price. Even though the price was twice 
that of six month earlier, farmers blocked roads and demanded that the government intervene 
in the market. The government guaranteed the farmers the price of 14,000 baht in its price- 
support program.  
In this way, amid the surge in domestic rice prices, the Thai government, instead of export 
restriction or price policy favoring the consumer, implemented a price-support intervention 
for farmers. Why did the Thai government respond to the price surge contrastingly to the 
other two major exporters, India and Vietnam? This was partly because Thailand has 
developed the capacity to provide enough rice to domestic consumers and, at the same time, 
the consumers are well enough off to accept the price rise of white rice. This chapter will 
describe how Thailand has reached the present position which allowed for the maintenance of 
its free trade policy in the storm of the food crisis.  
This chapter is organized as follows. The next section will identify the position of the Thai 
rice industry both in the world rice market and in the Thai macro economy. Then, the process 
and factors which have raised Thailand’s capacity of rice supply will be examined in Section 
2. Section 3 identifies the role of the government in the recent production increase. The last 
section will be a discussion focusing on why the Thai government did not apply trade 
restriction policy but rather applied a price-support scheme in the price surge of 2008. 
                                                  
1 The price of 5 percent white rice in April, 2008 based on the data of Office of Agricultural Economics 
(http://www.oae.go.th/oae_website/oae_monthprice.php). 
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1. Rice in Thailand, Thai Rice in the World 
 
Thailand is the outstanding rice exporter in the world. Its export volume has ranked first for 
nearly three decades since 1982, and accounted for 30 percent of the world rice trade between 
2003 and 2007, leaving the second and third largest exporters, India and Vietnam, far behind. 
Its wide coverage of the market is another outstanding feature of Thai rice. Its market is not 
limited to Asia, but now the largest portion (40 percent) goes to Africa. Europe, Latin America, 
and Oceania are also among the destinations for Thai rice export. Thailand can provide a wide 
variety of rice, both in terms of type, such as fragrant rice, white rice, and parboiled rice, and 
in terms of grade, from 100 percent long grain to broken rice. Another noteworthy fact is its 
high surplus of rice shared for export. At present, Thailand can spare about half of its rice 
production for export, which is exceptional among countries growing rice as the staple, 
including India and Vietnam.  
In the Thai national economy, however, the rice industry is no longer a major sector. It 
produces only 2 percent of the total value added in Thailand in 2000, down from 13 percent in 
1960 and 6 percent in 1980.2 The share of rice in total export was only 3 percent in 2000, a 
considerable decline from 30 percent in 1960 and 15 percent in 1980.3 There was an export 
duty called the rice premium which provided 10 percent of the governmental revenue until the 
mid-1960s, but now the rice industry receives a subsidy from the government (Ammar 1975, 
p.151).  
Compared with the declining importance of rice in terms of macro economy, there is still a 
considerable percentage of the population involved in rice cultivation. In 2003, the 
agricultural sector still comprised more than 40 percent of the total labor force in the rainy 
season,4 while nearly 70 percent of farm households were engaged in paddy cultivation (NSO 
2005). A half of farmland is shared for paddy in 2000, and farmers earned nearly 30 percent 
of farm gross cash income from paddy in the 2001/02 season.5 Ninety percent of harvested 
crop was sold into the market in 2000, while the share was 60 percent in 1980.6 Paddy is now 
an important commercial crop for farmers.  
On the other hand, consumers spend a smaller portion of their budget for rice than ever. On 
average, a Thai now eats 100 kilograms of rice per year, two-thirds of the volume which was 
consumed in the 1980s. The expenditure for grain as the staple was 1.3 percent of total 
household expenditure in 2004 among Bangkok residents, a considerable decline from the 
peak, 7 percent in 1975 (NSO 1979; 2004).  
                                                  
2 Calculated from the National Income of Thailand, 1960-1975 edition and 1980-2001 edition of the National 
Economic and Social Development Board (retrieved from www.nesdb.go.th). 
3 Calculated from the data in Bank of Thailand, Monthly Report, (December, 1967 and December, 1985) and 
Bank of Thailand homepage (www.bot.or.th/ENGLISH/STATISTICS/Pages/index1.aspx). 
4 Calculated from the Labour Force Survey data (http://web.nso.go.th/eng/en/stat/lfs_e/lfse00.htm). 
5 The farmland data is retrieved from the homepage of the Office of Agricultural Economics (OAE) 
(http://www.oae.go.th/download/article/article_20090417180859.html) while the income data is calculated 
from the OAE database. 
6 Volume of rice for sale is assumed as total production minus self consumption of rice farming households. The 
volume of self consumption of rice farming households for 1960 is based on Ammar and Wirot (1990, pp.166, 
379), while that for 2000 is calculated by multiplying the per capita rice consumption (retrieved from 
FAOSTAT, Food Balance Sheet) and the number of rice farming household members (based on NSO 2002; 
2005). The volume of total rice production can be calculated from the data in the Statistical Yearbook of 
Agriculture edited by Office of Agricultural Economics. See more detail of the assumption applied for 1960 
figure at Shigetomi (1996, p.46).  
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2. The Road to the Top of the World 
 
There are three main factors which have established Thailand’s outstanding position as a 
rice-exporting country. This section will describe each factor in detail.  
 
Production Increase 
As shown in Figure 4-1, the rice-export volume of Thailand has been increasing along with 
production. The increase of production can be attributed to two factors, the increase of planted 
area and yield. Figure 4-2 plots the data from 1938 to 2008, using planted area as the 
horizontal axis and yield as the vertical axis.  
The figure indicates that, until the 1950s, the yield increased little while the planted area 
expanded at a rapid pace. In the 1960s, the planted area continued to increase as the yield 
turned upward. In the 1970s, the yield became stagnant, but planted area continued to grow. 
After the 1980s, the increase of planted area slowed down while the yield increased 
remarkably.  
Source: Office of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural Statistics of Thailand .various years, and United
Nations, Uncomtrade  (comtrade.un.org/db/default.aspx).
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
16000
18000
20000
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
8000
9000
1962-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-06
Production
（1,000tons）
Export
（1,000tons）
Period (Year)
Others
North America
Central and 
South America
Europe
Africa
Middle East
Asia
Production 
volume
Production
Export
Export destination
 
 
 
76              The World Food Crisis and the Strategies of Asian Rice Exporters             
 
 
 
Note: One rai is about 0.16ha.
Figure 4-3 Change of Farmland and Rice Planted Area for Rainy Season and Dry Season Crop
Source: Office of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural Statistics of Thailand . various years.
40000
50000
60000
70000
80000
90000
100000
110000
120000
130000
140000
20000
30000
40000
50000
60000
70000
80000
19
50
/5
1
19
53
/5
4
19
56
/5
7
19
59
/6
0
19
62
/6
3
19
65
/6
6
19
68
/6
9
19
71
/7
2
19
74
/7
5
19
77
/7
8
19
80
/8
1
19
83
/8
4
19
86
/8
7
19
89
/9
0
19
92
/9
3
19
95
/9
6
19
98
/9
9
20
01
/0
2
20
04
/0
5
1,000 rai1,000 rai
Crop year
Dry season crop (left axis)
Rainy seacon crop (left axis)
Farmland (right axis)
 
Note: One rai is about 0.16ha.
Source: Office of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural Statistics of Thailand . various years.
 Figure 4-2  Change of Rice Planted Area and Yield (Three years moving average)
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Note: Ratio of Irrigable Area = Rice planted area in irrigable fiield / Total paddy field×100
Source: Office of Agricultural Economics (OAE), database.
Figure 4-4 Change in Ratio of Dry Season Rice Plantation and  Ratio of Irrigable Rice Field 
 Ratio of dry season rice plantation = planted area of dry season rice / planted area of rainy season rice × 100
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The increase of rice planted area until the 1970s was attributed to the expansion of 
farmland. Figure 4-3 shows that the farmland had been expanding until the mid-1980s and its 
growth rate was considerable in the 1960s and 1970s. This was possible because there used to 
be plenty of land left in natural conditions, such as forest and swamp in Thailand. When this 
unused land became accessible through the construction of canals and roads, it was rapidly 
cleared and turned into farmland. However, the opportunity to find unoccupied land was 
already disappearing before the 1970s. The percentage of farmland has decreased since the 
late 1980s when the rapid economic growth stimulated non-farm use of land. The paddy field 
did not expand after the end of the 1970s, rather even showing some decline.  
Even after the area of main season crop became stagnant or trended downward, the area of 
dry season crop has continued increasing. This is attributed to the expansion of planted area 
after the 1980s. It is noteworthy that the planted area accelerated its pace of increase after the 
1990s. This is because multiple cropping of rice is disseminating rather than the expansion of 
area where dry season plantation is possible. Figure 4-4 shows that the ratio of dry season 
planted area to rainy season planted area has been increasing since the mid-1990s even though 
the ratio of irrigable land has not increased. The actual situation of multiple cropping in the 
main rice-growing area will be presented later. 
 
Yield Increase 
Despite Thailand having been one of the top rice-exporting countries since before World War 
II, its average yield gradually declined until the end of the 1950s. It turned upward after that, 
however, and reached a level more than twice that of 1960 (Figure 4-2). The yield increase in  
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Note: One rai is about 0.16ha.
Figure 4-5 Rice Yield for Planted Area
Source: Office of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural Statistics of Thailand .various years.
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the 1960s was observed in every region but the South. According to a researcher of the Rice 
Research Institute, Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, the increase was attributed to 
the construction of dams in the central region and the improvement of paddy fields by 
peasants themselves.7 In the 1970s, on the contrary, the yield was stagnant because there was 
little room left for these infrastructural developments by both the government and peasants. At 
that time, the high-yielding varieties of rice were not yet widely disseminated.  
The development of rice variety in Thailand had started in the 1960s through the 
collaboration of the Thai government and the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI). In 
1969, the first high-yielding varieties, such as RD1 and RD3, which were derived from IR8, 
the so-called “Miracle Rice,” were developed in Thailand (SoWoThoCho 2001). In the 1970s, 
new varieties with short stature and photoperiod insensitivity, including IR varieties, were 
released to farmers. They were rapidly accepted, especially in the central region. Jerachone 
(1973) reported that in his sample villages in Suphan Buri province in 1971, the share of new 
varieties was 40 percent of total paddy planted area. A similar survey was implemented in the 
same villages for the 1978/79 season, and the share rose to more than 80 percent (Vivat 1979). 
However, this research also found that the share of new varieties in non-irrigated areas was 
only 9 to 11 percent. The dissemination of new varieties was limited to the dry season rice in 
irrigated areas where the water level could be controlled for the short stature and non-photo 
period sensitive varieties. The dissemination of new varieties in the 1970s contributed to the 
yield increase in the 1980s, since the average yield of dry season crop was twice that of rainy 
season crop (Figure 4-5).  
                                                  
7 An interview at the Rice Research Institute on August 20, 1999. 
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After the late 1990s, however, the yield of dry season crop became stagnant while the yield 
of rainy season crop trended upward. This reflects the fact that there is no experimental 
innovation for upgrading the yield of varieties for dry season crop while farmers became more 
and more active in investment and management for rice production.8 In summary, the growth 
of rice production from the mid-1990s is attributed to the yield increase of rainy season crop 
and the area expansion of dry season crop. 
 
Changing Farm Management of Rice Cultivation 
The recent change of rice cultivation can be confirmed by a field observation in Suphan Buri 
province, located at the northwest fringe of the Chao Phraya Delta, which is the major rice 
production area for export in Thailand.9 The present method of rice cultivation in this 
province can be roughly described as follows. Farmers plow and level the field and fill it with 
water at the depth of five to ten centimeters. After discharging the water for a while, farmers 
broadcast germinated seeds on the wet field. Amid the growth of young plants, farmers apply 
herbicides and fertilizers, and irrigate the field. Rice is harvested by a combine harvester into 
bags and loaded on a truck waiting on the side of the paddy field. The truck goes to rice mills 
and paddy markets directly. Farmers burn paddy straw and stalks left on the field.  
Most work is now done with the help of machines. Not only plowing and harvesting, but 
also the broadcasting of seeds and chemicals is performed by small machines carried by 
workers. Instead of inputting their own family labor, farmers hire workers and machine 
operators to carry out these works. This sort of job, the contracting-out by farmers in paddy 
cultivation, has become more and more popular in this last decade. The volume of fertilizer 
for paddy has rapidly increased in this decade. Farmers used to apply less than 180 kilograms 
of chemical fertilizers per hectare ten years ago while they now input more than 300 up to 360 
kilograms of chemical fertilizers plus 180 to 300 kilograms of organic fertilizers.  
Paddy is planted three times a year now. An agricultural extension officer remembers that 
there were only two crops, rainy season and dry season crop, in Suphan Buri in 1999, which 
means that the change occurred within this decade. The main varieties used to be those which 
take 120 days until harvest. Now farmers apply the short maturity date variety of 90 days and 
plant the rainy season crop from May to August, the first dry season crop from September to 
December, and the second dry season crop from January to April. It used to be difficult to 
plant rice during the September to December season because the dry season variety is too 
short to resist the high water level of the rainy season. However, the introduction of large 
pumps and drainage facilities has lowered the water level enough to allow for planting new 
varieties. This means that there is no interval between rice crops. It is not rare to see a paddy 
field with brown rice plants waiting for harvest and a field with green young rice plants side 
by side. Farmers burn straw and stalks after harvest since the short interval may otherwise 
allow insects to survive until the next plantation. Many farmers have sold their land 
ownership to capitalists from the non-farm sector and continue to cultivate the land while 
paying rent to their landowners.  
 
                                                  
8 An interview at the Bureau of Rice Research and Development, Rice Department on April 28, 2009. 
9 Following description on Suphan Buri province depends on the data obtained by a field visit to Suphan Buri 
province and an interview to an agricultural extension officer of Suphan Buri Agricultural Extension Office on 
May 1, 2009.  
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In this way, the rice farmers in Suphan Buri secure most factors of production from out of 
their own household. The remaining tasks of farmers are to pay attention to the condition of 
rice plants, control the water level, and hire contractors. The extension officer described 
present-day rice farmers as managers rather than peasants. In summary, rice farming in 
Suphan Buri province comes to be more land- and capital-intensive while farmers are now 
managers who procure various inputs, including the labor force, from out of their family. The 
increase of rice production is based on such a change of farm management in rice-growing 
areas.  
 
Downward Turn of Domestic Consumption 
In 1960, Thailand produced around five million tons of rice, of which 1.3 million tons were 
exported. In those years, there was a pessimistic prediction that all the rice would be 
consumed domestically within a decade or two because of the population increase (Chaiyong 
1960, p.188).  
Figure 4-6 shows the margin between the volume of rice production and domestic 
consumption in the colored space. This margin shows the capacity of rice export from 
Thailand. The gap did not expand until the early 1970s since domestic consumption increased 
parallel to production. The situation changed in the 1980s when the increase of domestic 
consumption slowed down while production continued to grow. The gap between production 
and domestic consumption apparently started to widen and, in the 1990s, widened more 
rapidly. The ample supply margin for export in present-day Thailand, thus, has been created 
since the 1980s.  
 
 
 
       
Source:  FAOSTAT, Commodity Balances, Crops Primary Equivalent (http://faostat.fao.org). 
Figure 4-6  Balance Sheet of Rice 
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The decrease in per capita rice consumption and the population growth rate have left the 
domestic consumption volume stagnant. As the bold line graph in the figure shows, per capita 
rice consumption increased until the early 1970s, turned downward in the late 1970s, and 
became stable after the 1990s. As for the population, the growth rate exceeded 3 percent in the 
early 1960s, and turned down to 2 percent in the late 1970s and 1.6 percent in the early 1980s.  
 
Developing International Markets 
The excess of rice would deter production if it were not sold in the foreign markets and piled 
in stock. In other words, Thailand could enhance its rice production because it could sell rice 
in the international market. Thailand became the top exporter in the 1980s when the trade 
volume as a whole in the international market did not expand. In that decade, Thailand was in 
a fierce competition with the United States.  
The stagnation of total trade volume was caused by the decrease in imports by Asian 
countries, from five million tons in 1980 to three million tons in 1990.10 This dramatic 
decline occurred because major importing countries, such as Indonesia and the Philippines, 
raised their self-sufficiency in rice supply. However, Middle Eastern and African countries 
increased their imports from 1.4 million to 1.8 million tons and from 2.5 million to 3.1 million 
tons, respectively. Thailand successfully increased its market share in these areas in the 1980s. 
In the Middle Eastern market, Thailand used to be far behind the US, but it caught up to the 
US in the 1980s. It competed closely with the US in the African market, but left the US far 
behind in the 1980s. 
In the 1980s, the US government tried to control the production volume of rice in order to 
lessen the fiscal burden of subsidy. On the contrary, the Thai government stimulated rice 
production by cutting down the rice premium, an export duty. The policy toward rice 
production contrasted sharply between these two governments. The aggressive policy of 
Thailand ended in a success because it could develop the emerging markets such as the 
Middle East and Africa.  
 
Entrepreneurship of Rice Exporters 
Market development owes its success to the efforts of Thai rice exporters. Figure 4-7 shows 
the rises and falls of rice exporters which are put into categories by the period of their 
entrance into the rice-export industry. Group A are the exporters who have existed since 
World War II. Group B consists of the exporters called the ‘Five Tigers’ which cooperated 
with each other, for example by sharing orders and exchanging information, to gain market 
share from  Group A. Groups C and D are the exporters who entered into the rice-export 
industry in the 1960s and 1970s to catch up with the Five Tigers. In the late 1970s, the 
exporters were in fierce competition, and those categorized as Group D performed better than 
the others in the 1980s.   
 
                                                  
10 Based on FAOSTAT data (faostat.fao.org/site/535/default.aspx#ancor), retrieved August 23, 2010. 
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Figure 4-7  Rice Export Volume by Rice Exporters Group
Source: Foreighn Trade Department, Ministry of Commerce and the Thai Rice
Exporters' Association.
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The representative exporters of this group were Soon Hua Seng, Capital Rice, and 
Chaiyaporn Rice. These firms had kept the top three positions among more than one hundred 
exporters for the 13 years from 1989 to 2002.11 Compared with the former exporters whose 
main market was Asia, the Group D exporters had been very eager to penetrate emerging 
markets, such as Africa and the Middle East. For example, Soon Hua Seng established its 
offices in Paris, Lomé in the Republic of Togo, and Dubai in the United Arab Emirates in the 
1980s in order to respond to the needs of customers. This company sometimes sold rice 
directly to African customers without relying on international rice traders and brokers. It 
surprised other traders when it floated a rice cargo ship near the African coast to sell rice 
immediately when African customers, who often had financial difficulty, were ready to pay.12 
These methods were new for Thai rice exporters in those years. Capital Rice started its rice 
business by targeting the African market, and took the order of Europe for its food assistance 
program for Africa. Later, it expanded its market into Europe, the Middle East, communist 
countries such as the USSR and China, and the South American countries of Brazil, Chile, 
and Peru.13 Chaiyaporn Rice exported rice to Nigeria and Brazil, Chile, and Peru, and it later 
penetrated the rice markets in other African countries and the Middle East.14 In this way, the 
                                                  
11 The author calculated the figures from the data of Adisak (2003) and the Thai Rice Exporters Association. In 
the case that there are more than two companies registered as rice exporters under the same proprietor, the 
figure of the leading firm represents the total export volume of group companies.   
12 Based on the author’s interview at Soon Hua Seng on June 25, 1990 and the reports in Prachachat Thurakit 
(1989) and Wirat (1986).  
13 Interview at Capital Rice on June 13, 1990.  
14 Interview at Chaiyaporn Rice on June 14, 1990. 
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fastest growing rice exporters in the 1980s were those which dared to find new markets in 
Africa, the Middle East, and South America. In other words, these challenging exporters 
contributed to expanding the Thai rice market into new parts of the world.  
As for the African market, the role of government-to-government (G-to-G) trade played a 
role to some extent. In the early 1980s, 20 to 30 percent of total export to Africa went through 
G-to-G contacts.15 In cases regarding importers insecure in payment, finance institutions may 
not open the letter of credit (L/C). As a result, it is often the case that private trade is mediated 
by credible international rice traders or that the government assumes the risk of the trade.  
 
 
3. Government Intervention and Its Impact on the Rice Industry 
 
The Thai government did not intervene in rice export even during the unprecedented price 
surge in early 2008 simply because there was no scheme ready to do so. It seems as if the Thai 
government applies the laissez-faire principle in rice trade. However, the role of government 
considerably influences the present performance of rice production and export in Thailand.  
 
Market Mechanism for Delivering Price Signal 
In Figure 4-8, the author roughly sketches the domestic channels of rice trade in Thailand. 
Farmers sell paddy to local traders or rice mills through direct negotiation. In some cases, 
they bring their paddy into a local paddy marketplace to find traders who may offer the most 
favorable price. 
Rice millers usually purchase paddy by spot payments and mill it into white rice. When 
millers sell the white rice to exporters and/or wholesalers on the domestic market, they settle 
the trade through brokers called yong, originally a Chinese word. A yong collects information 
about the volume, kind, and price of rice which exporters and wholesalers want to purchase, 
and delivers the information to rice millers in the provinces. When the trade is settled, millers 
pay a commission, usually 0.75 percent of the trade value, to the yong and send the rice to the 
exporters and wholesalers. Millers get payment one to three months later.  
A rice miller does not care whether its rice is sold for export or the domestic market, but 
care how much the purchaser offers for its rice. As a result, wholesalers have to offer prices as 
high as those offered by exporters in order to secure rice for their business. In this way, the 
price change in the international market immediately affects the wholesale price in the 
domestic market through the competition in purchasing rice at rice millers. This results 
directly in the change of retail price.  
To sum up, there is no system to partition the flow of rice for export and domestic outlets. 
Stakeholders in trade compete with each other at each trade level. The price surge in the 
international market in early 2008 was immediately reflected in the rice price in each 
domestic trade level. 
                                                  
15 Calculated from the data of the Foreign Trade Department (1990).  
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Governmental Intervention into Rice Trade 
At present, traders who registered as rice exporters to the government can export rice without 
any restriction except that they must submit trade documents, such as the L/C and contract, 
and receive the standard quality inspection.16 Although the government requires exporters to 
submit request forms of export, this is just to collect export data. This regulation was defined 
in the revision of the Commerce Ministry’s regulations on rice export in 1991.  
Before that, there used to be several regulations that controlled rice export. Table 4-1 shows 
the major programs of the Thai government to intervene in the rice price mechanism. These 
programs are categorized into those which are expected to push down the domestic price (in 
the upper half of the table) and those which are for pulling up domestic price (in the lower 
half columns).  
The most effective device for pushing down domestic price was the rice premium. The 
government could absorb the impact of a price rise in the international market by raising the 
rate of the rice premium. Until the 1970s, the rice premium accounted for 20 to 30 percent of 
the export price at Bangkok.17 Another frequently applied program was the compulsory  
                                                  
16 The regulation of rice export is explained at the homepage of the Foreign Trade Department 
(www.dft.moc.go.th/the_files/$$8/level4/rice_export.html ). See also Foreign Trade Department, “Khumu kan 
song ok khao” (Manual for rice export), retrieved from  
(www.dft.moc.go.th/level4Frame.asp?sPage=/the_files/$$16/level4/a_w%20book.pdf&level3=370).  
17 Data from Thai Rice Exporters’ Association. 
Figure 4-8  Domestic Market Channels of Rice
Source: Prepared by the author.
Note: (1) The marketplace facilitated for farmers and
merchants to negotiate and trade paddy.
(2) There are two types of brokers, one for the domestic
and the other for the export market.
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Table 4-1  Government Programs for Price Intervention 
Expected 
impact on 
domestic  
rice price 
Program name Start year End year 
Down 
  Rice premium 1954 1986 
  Export tax 1952 1985 
  Compulsory storage 1960 1982 
  Export quota(1) 1974 1978 
Up 
  Export quota(2) 1984 1986 
  Direct purchase by state agencies 1975(3) 1980s and 1990(4) 
  Pledging 1982 2009 
Source: Benchang (2000, pp.30-31）, Supiya (1991, pp.85-86）, Ammar and Suthad (1989, 
p.30）, Ammar (1975, p.238）, Sukchai et al. (1982）. 
Note: (1) The puopose was controlling the volume of export. The quota was distributed 
according to the past records of export.  
(2)The quota was distributed according to the stock volume for encouraging exporters to 
purchase rice from the domestic market. 
(3) The intial program started in 1966, but has become substantially effective since 1975. 
(4) The programs were gradually replaced by the pledging scheme in the 1980s and 1990s. 
 
 
storage scheme, in which exporters were forced to sell a certain amount of rice to the 
government at the officially fixed price. The amount of enforced delivery was occasionally set 
as high as 200 percent of export volume (Supiya 1991). This purchased rice was stored and 
sold to urban consumers at a relatively low price when the market price surged. The export 
quota in the 1970s was to control the volume of rice exported during periods of strong 
demand in the foreign market.  
These programs for price control had been abolished by the mid-1980s. On the contrary, 
price enhancement schemes have been seriously implemented from the 1980s up to the 
present. The export quota in the 1980s was allocated according to the stock volume of the 
exporter, which is intended to motivate exporters to purchase more rice in the domestic 
market. Although the scheme of purchasing paddy by government agencies started in 1966, it 
has only functioned practically since the mid-1970s. The volume of purchase started to 
increase in the 1980s. The paddy pledging scheme started in 1982 as a governmental program 
for pulling up farm prices, and became the major scheme for supporting farmers. The volume 
of procurement in this program reached 20 percent of total production in the year 2000.  
In this way, the Thai government changed its price intervention policy from a 
consumer-oriented to a producer-oriented one in the 1980s. This contrasts with India and 
Vietnam, which still keep schemes to protect consumers from price surges. This 
transformation happened in the 1980s partly because per capita rice consumption had already 
started to go downward and because the expenditure for rice dropped in the household budget. 
According to the government’s household expenditure survey, a household in Bangkok spent  
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Table 4-2   Volume of Pledged Rice and its Share in Total 
Production 
Crop year 
Pledged rice  
(1,000 tons) 
Share in total 
production 
(%) 
1995/96 1,180 5.4 
1996/97 860 3.9 
1997/98 780 3.3 
1998/99 670 2.9 
1999/2000 698 2.9 
2000/2001 2,076 8.0 
2001/2002 6,091 21.7 
2002/2003 5,584 19.9 
2003/2004 2,502 8.5 
2004/2005 6,093 21.4 
2005/2006 7,466 24.6 
2006/2007 3,445 11.6 
2007/2008 4,368 13.6 
2008/2009 10,680 33.3 
Source: Internal Trade Department, homepage (www.dit.go.th), 
Benchang (2000, p.33), Uti sapha (2010). 
 
 
 
on average 7 percent of total expenditure for grain in 1975, but only 3 percent in 1988 (NSO 
1979; 1990). When the government started its price-support scheme for farmers in 1976, 
urban sector workers in Bangkok immediately protested against the policy, whereas there was 
no collective action among urban dwellers in 1981 when the price of white rice rose sharply.  
In the midst of the price surge in 2008, urban consumers stayed calm, too. Rather, the 
export control was called for by rice exporters who had to purchase rice in the domestic 
market at surging prices (Prachachat thurakit 2008). However, the Commerce Minister 
insisted that there was no need of intervention by referring to his calculation that six million 
tons of domestic need could be secured by 2.1 million tons of governmental rice stock and the 
coming harvest of four million tons of dry season crop (TREA 2008). 
 
Paddy Pledging Scheme 
As mentioned before, the paddy pledging scheme had been the main component of programs 
for supporting farm prices since the 1990s. The scheme was implemented in the following 
manner. A farmer pledges his/her paddy in a warehouse of his own, a farmers’ organization, or 
a rice mill in the same province. The government assigns the Bank of Agriculture and 
Agricultural Cooperatives (BAAC), a state enterprise for accommodating finance in the rural 
sector, to lend the farmer money equivalent to the value of the pledged rice. The value is 
calculated at a price predetermined by the government. Rice mills are allowed to accept rice 
volume to a maximum of 50 times the daily milling capacity. The mills are required to have 
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facilities for drying and stocking paddy. Milled rice is sent to warehouses arranged by the 
government.18 The farmer can choose within three to four months, whether to forfeit or 
redeem the pawn. In the former case, the farmer keeps the lent money as the payment of the 
paddy. This means that the scheme guarantees that farmers sell their paddy at the 
governmentally fixed price. In the latter case, the farmer must pay interest at 3 percent per 
annum. 
The volume of pledged paddy was not significant until the 1990s, in most years, less than 5 
percent of total production (Table 4-2). However, the share reached more than 10 percent, 
sometimes 20 percent, after 2000. It had become a meaningful program for many farmers.  
 
The Impact of the Scheme on Production and Export 
The paddy pledging scheme is one of the factors that has effected the change in farm 
management of rice cultivation. As we have seen in the case of Suphan Buri, farmers 
increased input because they could expect a certain level of paddy price under this scheme. 
The yield has been increasing and paddy has been planted three times rather than twice in a 
year. These two changes have brought the rapid increase of rice production volume. 
 
 
  
 
       
Source: United States of America, Department of Agriculture homepage(www.usda.gov/psdonline/). 
Figure 4-9 Ratio of Stock to Domestic Consumption Volume at the Year End (%) 
 
                                                  
18 Based on the explanation for rainy season crop of 2006/07 posted on the homepage of the Department of 
Internal Trade (www.dit.go.th).  
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
19
60
/1
96
1
19
62
/1
96
3
19
64
/1
96
5
19
66
/1
96
7
19
68
/1
96
9
19
70
/1
97
1
19
72
/1
97
3
19
74
/1
97
5
19
76
/1
97
7
19
78
/1
97
9
19
80
/1
98
1
19
82
/1
98
3
19
84
/1
98
5
19
86
/1
98
7
19
88
/1
98
9
19
90
/1
99
1
19
92
/1
99
3
19
94
/1
99
5
19
96
/1
99
7
19
98
/1
99
9
20
00
/2
00
1
20
02
/2
00
3
20
04
/2
00
5
20
06
/2
00
7
%
88              The World Food Crisis and the Strategies of Asian Rice Exporters             
 
 
Rice millers welcomed the scheme, too. They received fees for milling pledged paddy, 
which meant that accepting more paddies gives them more income. Since the capital for 
paying farmers was provided by the BAAC, the millers could save their capital for other 
purposes, such as enlarging the scale of production. They had an incentive to develop their 
facilities since the government allocated the amount of paddy according to the rice-milling 
capacity and the facilities for drying and stocking. During the period from 2003 to 2007, the 
number of participating rice mills fluctuated between 400 and 800. Compared with the 
membership of the Thai Rice Mills Association, which was around 800 in 2009,19 it can be 
said that a considerable number of mills joined this program.  
Since the pledged rice was stored as the stock of the government, the volume of stock in 
Thailand apparently increased after the expansion of this program. As shown in Figure 4-9, 
the stock started to decrease when the compulsory delivery scheme ended at the end of the 
1980s, but turned upward again in the late 1990s. The figure indicates that the government 
had a stock of rice equivalent to 20 to 30 percent of yearly domestic consumption. This helped 
the government to refrain from controlling export volume even in the situation of early 2008. 
However, the government had to discharge the stock, too. Usually, the government invited 
exporters for a public tender. This gave an opportunity for some new exporters to increase 
their export volume rapidly. The exporters, such as President Agri Trading, Asia Golden Rice, 
and Phonlap, appeared in the list of the top ten exporters in the late 1990s. They were still 
very small exporters or had not yet been founded in the 1980s. Their success can be partly 
attributed to the aggressive bidding in the stock tender by the government (Prachachat 
Thurakit 2001; Phusadee 2005; Than Setthakit 2008). The government had to save the storage 
cost and, moreover, secure storage space to accept new pledged rice in the coming season, 
with the result that the highest bid was often considerably lower than market price.20 This 
scheme gave a subsidy not only to farmers but also to bid-winning exporters since the 
government sold rice at a lower-than-market price.  
 
Financial Burden of the Government 
The paddy pledging scheme benefited farmers, millers, and exporters, while the cost of the 
scheme was shouldered by the government. The government had to compensate for the back 
spread between the purchasing and selling prices of rice. Figure 4-10 compares the market 
price of 5 percent paddy and the pledged price. It shows the latter was considerably higher 
than the former, especially when there were some political events in which the government 
needed to attract the support of the rural population, such as the period when the 
newly-formed Thaksin Shinawatra Administration had to demonstrate its populist policy in 
2001 and 2002, and when the Thaksin Administration was shaken by anti-government 
movements among the urban middle class in early 2006 and 2008. The government might 
have had a chance to gain if the market price had risen from the level of the purchasing price. 
Actually, however, the chance was slim because the government had purchased rice at an 
inflated price. In October, 2006, the Finance Minister disclosed that the deficit of the scheme 
during the 2004-2006 seasons was 18 billion baht (Phusadee & Chatrudee 2006), which is  
                                                  
19 Based on the information in the homepage of the Thai Rice Mills Association (www.thairicemillers.com) and 
an interview at the Association on April 29, 2009.  
20 For example, the highest bid was US$183 per ton for 5 percent white rice in August, 2005 when the market 
price was US$287 (Phusadee 2005). 
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Source: Office of Agricultural Economics homepage and Internal Trade Department homepage. 
Figure 4-10 Market Price and Pledged Price of Paddy (monthly average) 
 
 
equivalent to 1.3 percent of the total state budget or 25 percent of the budget for agriculture in 
2006. In addition to compensation for this price gap, the government had to pay the cost of 
transportation and storage. 
 
The Rice Pledging Scheme and Farm Economy 
In spite of the heavy burden to the government coffers, this scheme continued for decades. As 
we saw in the case of Suphan Buri, farmers had been increasing their input, presuming that 
the pledging scheme would be there to guarantee the paddy price. Figure 4-11 shows the cost, 
price, and profit per unit area (rai or 0.16ha) of rainy season paddy from 1994 to 2008 in real 
terms (deflated by consumer price index). Even though the yield of rainy season crop was 
increasing during the same period as seen already, the cost did not show any downward 
tendency, and the profit went up and down according to the price fluctuation. Since paddy 
cultivation has become more and more capital intensive, farmers tend to call on the 
government to raise the guarantee price under the pledging scheme. Pushing the government 
may end with a higher guarantee price, since the price is decided through political 
consideration by the government. In May 2008, rice farmers engaged in collective action, 
such as blocking roads, even though the paddy price was still as high as twice that of a half 
year earlier. At that time, the oil price surged to push the prices of agricultural inputs up.  For  
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Note: One rai is about 0.16ha. 
Source: The database and homepage of Office of Agricultural Economics. 
Figure 4-11 Cost and Profitability of Paddy Production (Rainy season rice, deflated by CPI based
 on 2007 price) 
 
example, the fertilizer price jumped 50 percent from December 2007 to May 2008.21 
Therefore, farmers were afraid that the price fall would force them to lose the opportunity of 
gain, or possibly even end up in debt. Meanwhile, in Bangkok, the middle class aggressively 
organized collective, anti-government actions. The government thus could never lose the 
support of the rural people. This was the backdrop against which the government set the 
pledging price at 14,000 baht, which was 2,000 baht higher than the exceptionally high 
market price of paddy in Thailand at that time. 
Comparative poverty still remains a serious social problem in Thai society, as the income of 
a farm household on average is 40 percent that of the urban middle class.22 Moreover, the 
rural population has recognized that their votes matter in national politics after Thaksin 
Shinawatra implemented the populist policies in 2001. The present Democrat-led government 
abolished the rice pledging program, but introduced an income guarantee program instead. In 
this new program, farmers will receive a subsidy equivalent to the gap between the market 
price and the governmentally guaranteed price in case the former falls below the latter. The 
present government asserts that the new scheme is better in saving expenditure for milling, 
transporting, and stocking rice, and in leaving the price mechanism to work in the domestic 
rice market. In any event, the Thai government, whether it is pro- or anti-Thaksin, does not 
seem to want to discontinue supportive policies for farmers.  
                                                  
21 The price data of agricultural inputs retrieved May 30, 2009 from the homepage of the Office of Agricultural 
Economics (www.oae.go.th). 
22 According to the Household and Socio-economic Survey (NSO 2008), the monthly expenditure of a farm 
operator’s household was 29 percent of that of a professional, technical, and administrative worker’s 
household, and 65 percent of that of a clerical, sales, and services worker’s household in 2007. 
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Conclusion 
 
Even though the surge in the export-rice price doubled the price to consumers within a half 
year, the government of Thailand did not take any measures to restrict rice export. The 
reasons were as follows. Firstly, a large volume of rice production prevented the government 
from feeling insecure in rice procurement for domestic consumption. At the time of the 
international price surge, the government had its rice stock equivalent to one-fifth of yearly 
domestic needs. Moreover, the dry season crop was soon to flow into the market. Secondly, 
consumers did not feel insecure about the rice supply since rice had never disappeared from 
retail stores, even when the price went up. The rice millers provide rice both to the export and 
domestic markets since there is no discrimination in price offered by the buyers of these two 
markets. Thirdly, the consumers could stay quiet since the price rise was not a serious threat 
to the economic stability of most consumers.  
This large surplus for export was the result of a widening gap between production and 
domestic consumption. Production has consistently increased for these five decades because 
of farm land expansion, until the 1970s, and yield increase which was brought about by the 
dissemination of high-yielding varieties and increasing inputs of farmers to their land. The 
consumption volume became stagnant and has even gone down since the 1980s because per 
capita consumption decreased in the 1970s and population growth slowed down. The 
downturn of per capita consumption may be the result of economic growth led by urban 
sector development.  
Compared with the urban sector growth, the rural economy was left far behind. The 
government changed its agricultural policy from a consumer-oriented to a producer-oriented 
one in the 1980s. The government implemented some schemes which might enhance market 
prices or ensure farmers a better price than that offered in the local market. The rice pledging 
scheme was one of such schemes and became the main tool of rice price policies. In the last 
decade, the scheme stimulated farmers to produce more rice from their fields. They input 
more fertilizers and planted rice as often as they could since they recognized that paddy price 
could be pushed up by collectively pressing the government. The production growth of Thai 
rice since the 1990s is partly owed to the price subsidy programs.   
Even though the subsidy scheme forced the government to shoulder a considerable fiscal 
burden, such subsidy was inevitable. The government is obliged to do so since farmers 
represent the poor of this society, while the politicians are willing to do so since farmers 
represent their constituency. The subsidy was also suitable to the past trend of the 
international market. The market has been expanding, and Thai rice could be sold anyway. 
The food crisis in 2008 was partly alleviated by Thailand’s capacity in providing rice to the 
world market. 
However, the good fortune of Thailand may disappear if the world market stops expanding 
or if new exporters emerge in the market. At that time, the high cost of rice production would 
be a serious problem determining the competitiveness of Thai rice. In this case, the 
government will be unable to support all rice growers. Thailand is now moving to the stage of 
a developed country, and its agriculture will need an adaptation in keeping with this new 
stage. 
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